A note on the fallibility of forecasts. In an entertaining piece for the
highlights some of the most obviously, immediately wrong predictions of the last year. He picks out
for his warning on February 20 2009: "The economy went into freefall and is still falling and we don't know where the bottom will be until we get there and there's no sign that we are anywhere near a bottom."
Yet only a month later, the markets had turned and Soros was to hand to declare that the "the collapse of the financial system" had been averted and the economy was recovering. The biggest mistake of a year ago, we know now (though some of us fortunately foresaw it), was to mistake a global financial panic for a return of the Great Depression. Not that the economic out-turn has been good; far from it.
In his
annual survey of economic forecasts two weeks ago, the always excellent
David Smith in the
Sunday Times discovered that not one of the mainstream forecasters whose predictions he monitored a year ago got anywhere near the actual outcomes for GDP, inflation and interest rates. The best prediction for GDP in the UK was minus 3.2%: the actual outcome (at least until the figures are subsequently revised) was minus 4.75%.
It is a timely reminder not to read too much into the waves of predictions now filling the financial pages. One of my firmest convictions after many years in the game is that short term investment decisions should never be based solely on economic analysis. The data is too ropey and in any event is swamped by market sentiment and investor behaviour. Valuation, momentum and technical analysis are much better guides to short term movements in the markets. Your thinking needs to stay flexible, as it always has done for Soros himself.
So I don’t automatically place that much credence on the kind of gloomy assessments coming out of the economics profession at the moment. This
story from Reuters, which quotes such luminaries of the profession as
Martin Feldstein and
Kenneth Rogoff, is a typical example. It is not that the gloomier members of the profession can’t be right. It is just that the track record of economists provides no justification for placing undue reliance on it.
Longer term projections are another thing. In
my most recent column for the Financial Times I highlight the way that
Sir John Templeton liked to make forecasts, which might be summed up as: make them big, and make them years ahead. In 1980 he took a stab at predicting where the Dow Jones index, then around 800, would be in 2020, 40 years ahead. On my calculations his forecast (the Dow at 16,000) is still very much on track. In part because of his Christian faith, Templeton was an optimist and a firm believer in the long term power of equities.
His investment philosophy was brilliantly summed up in just three words: “Buy cheap stocks”. To his mind, that simple approach dealt neatly with both asset allocation (if stocks aren’t cheap, don’t buy them) and stockpicking (the only stocks you can own with confidence are those that are cheap on valuation grounds). The biggest risk during periodic market downturns is to forget these simple rules of thumb.
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This is from the
Wall Street Journal on the so-called
January effect, the apparent historical fact that the way stocks perform in January is a significant indicator of the way they perform over the rest of the year.
"Historically, the first few trading days of January have been among the strongest for stock performance, because this is when individuals and pension plans add big chunks of new money to retirement accounts. Whether people follow their normal pattern and pump money into stocks in January can be a sign of the market's prospects for the coming weeks, and even for the entire year".
"If stocks rise in January, they often finish the year strongly. If stocks are weak during this normally propitious time, stocks tend to do poorly. January was weak in both 2008 and 2009. In 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell another 30% in the following 11 months, marking one of the worst stock-market years on record. In 2009, the January decline was followed by an 18% plunge to a 12-year low in March. Only after that pain did stocks roar back. This time, stocks already have gotten off to a disappointing start".

"In normal years, investors try to front-run the expected January rise, and they bid stocks higher in late December. Since 1900, the Dow has risen a median 1% in the last five trading days of December, according to Ned Davis Research, more than four times the median rise for five-day periods in general. In the five final trading days of this December, however, the Dow actually fell 0.37%".
"Now, investors are worrying about whether the December weakness will carry through into January. If so, it could augur poorly for 2010, or at least for the first months. "Strong years for equities normally show investment-buying early, with great upside momentum in January; most bad years start with down Januarys," notes Phil Roth, chief technical market analyst at New York brokerage house Miller Tabak + Co., in a report on January's importance.
"What analysts would like to see now is a strong January rally on heavy volume, suggesting investors are pouring new money into U.S. stocks. During much of the Dow's big post-March rally, trading volume has been below-average, suggesting that many investors remain skeptical of U.S. stocks. If volume remains low in January, it would be a further indication of investor doubt".
It didn’t work that way in 2009, which began terribly and finished strongly. My own opening hypothesis for the markets in 2010 is that there is further to go in the rally, but that we are also overdue a significant correction at some point. While January will set a tone for the early part of the year’s market action, just as with macro-economic forecasts, the January effect is not something on which any serious investor will want to rely.
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As a firm believer in what
Jack Bogle calls the CMH (the costs matter hypothesis), my view has always been that index funds, low cost ETFs and investment trusts are the preferred instruments for sensible investors, which is why they make up the bulk of my own portfolio. It is only in exceptional cases that the performance of unit trusts and other managed funds can justify their higher fees.
As for hedge funds, I have always been a sceptic, not because there aren’t some exceptional investors running hedge funds, but because their fees are so high that it makes it inevitable that they are run for the benefit of the managers first and the investors a distant second. At the same time the misalignment of interest between manager and investor makes them vulnerable to excessive risk-taking.
As will always be the case in a powerful market rally, because of their inbuilt gearing to general market movements, investment trusts were the place to be in 2009. The end year figures for investment trust performance, as compiled by the broking firm Close Winterflood, emphasise how good returns were, as underlying performance was boosted by a significant narrowing of discounts as the financial crisis receded from the first quarter onwards.
Here are a couple of standout examples from my own holdings.
SR Europe, a European investment trust run by the hedge fund managers Sloane Robinson (why pay them hedge fund fees when you can get their expertise more cheaply?): NAV up 43%, share price up 51%, FTSE Europe index up 22%.
Morant Wright Japan Income NAV up 20%, share price up 49%, Japanese market (TSE first section) minus 7%.
Of course the discounts on these and many other trusts had widened during the crisis, so some of these gains are merely catching up after their earlier above-market declines. But it remains the case that as long as you are prepared to live with the volatility, over the long haul the best investment trusts, with their low management fees and specialist skills, plus ability to borrow, are an excellent and efficient way to capture market returns.
It was notable how the improvement in discounts and share price performance tailed off in the last quarter of 2009. This might suggest that we are in for an early period of consolidation in the markets this year. However there was a special factor in the form of a large Norwegian investment institution selling all its investment trust holdings, for reasons that remain unclear, and this affected the price of a number of the larger investment trusts
.
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